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Abstract 
This paper uses data on collegiate basketball players who were drafted into the NBA from 1999 
through 2003. It examines the relationship between race and performance in terms of one of the 
highest forms of efficiency in basketball, field goal percentage, based on college statistics, with 
regard to draft position, career earnings and NBA win shares. Comparing a baseline regression 
with a regression containing an interaction term, black and field goal percentage, we were able to 
observe that black players were much more sensitive to an increase in draft pick, career earnings 
and win shares, when looking at field goal percentage, than their white counterpart. Analyzing an 
organization that is predominately black can give us a better grasp on how to deal with issues the 
United States, and the world are dealing with today. 
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1 Introduction 
 With the role race and equality are playing in the world today, whether it be the Black 
Lives Matter movement or equal pay for minorities and women in the workplace, the United 
States and the world as a whole is more divided than we’ve seen in recent memory. It seems as if 
the decision makers in our country can’t even come to an agreement on whether the sky is blue, 
much less policies that will make the world a better place. With our President being at the 
forefront of this turmoil it’s easy to see why racial issues are at the precipice of American 
society. In addition to these disputes, President Trump has also prevented, or at least made it 
difficult, for certain types of Muslim groups to enter the United States or even just stay put in a 
place where they have lived for a majority of their life. The issue of race relations in our country 
seem to be as divided as ever, and places such as Baltimore and Ferguson have engaged in 
violent protests, even to the point of rioting. While these problems in the world seem to get 
worse and minority groups keep getting put into a box where their rights are being stripped back 
to the days of early American culture, it would be interesting to flip the script and look at a 
corporation, the NBA, where minorities are the majority and if this, or any, racial or performance 
based prejudice extends to a workplace that is predominately black.  
 
2 Literature Review 
 Taking an analytical look into draft classes in any sport is no new venture. Baseball is the 
pioneer when it comes to sports analytics, most famously Bill James, who is credited with being 
the father of modern baseball analytics. His book, The Bill James Baseball Abstract, which was 
released in 1977, dove into the numbers in the box scores instead of only utilizing the “eye test,” 
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as many old-school baseball minds were doing. He tried to explain future performance by 
analyzing numbers to help paint a picture of how one player could be more valuable than the 
next player, even though on the surface they had similar basic numbers. He developed advanced 
statistics such as Win Shares, which is covered in this paper, as well as many other performance 
efficiency metrics that have been copied by most of the major sports leagues today. This lead to a 
huge phenomenon called Moneyball, in which the 2002 Oakland Athletics and their General 
Manager, Billy Beane, implemented these tactics in order to compete with teams who possessed 
much more buying power. Instead of only focusing on basic statistics, such as batting average, 
runs batted in and stolen bases, they looked at more advanced statistics that included on-base 
percentage and slugging percentage. They believed that they could acquire these players who 
excelled in such categories for pennies on the dollar compared to players who were being priced 
out of their range who, according to these metrics, were overrated. They went on to have a great 
season and inconceivably competed with teams who tripled their team salary.  
 When it comes to basketball, advanced statistics have only recently become a mainstay in 
the past 5-10 years. In that time frame, numerous papers have been published with an economic 
focus likening the 30 NBA franchises to a corporation and the players as their employees. 
However, starting with the basic scope, Staw and Hoang (1995) were some of the first to dive 
into the NBA in this light with their paper on sunk costs. Sunk costs in economics, as we know, 
are costs that have already been incurred and cannot be recovered. Looking at players from the 
1980 draft through the 1986 draft, they concluded that teams were more likely to give a player 
drafted higher more playing time and opportunity to prove themselves due to the time they had 
invested in that player to that point. Higher draft picks are paid exponentially more and front 
offices are scrutinized heavily for missing on them as opposed to a player picked lower in the 
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draft. With more time it would be interesting to see how certain advanced statistics correlate with 
future performance in the NBA and if you would be able to predict a player’s career path based 
on such statistics.  
Groothius, Hill and Perri (2007) looked at superstar players playing in the NBA and 
where they were picked in the draft. Their study found that superstar players are usually 
identified early, however, more false positives exist than correct decisions with high draft picks. 
Seeing as many studies have reached the conclusion that draft pick has an effect on career length 
and playing time in the NBA, this sets us up to find out if race and performance tie into this 
equation at all by looking at a player’s college statistics.  
This is what Coates and Oguntimein (2008) look to do in their paper in predicting career 
length based on college production. They look at the players in the NBA draft from 1987 through 
1989 that have at least one year of NBA experience using points, rebounds, assists, steals, 
blocks, field goal percentage and free throw percentage to try and assess the effectiveness of 
NBA executives in identifying college players who will be successful in the pros. Coates and 
Oguntimein discovered that blocks, free throw percentage and field goal percentage are 
important determinants of draft position for small conference players.. While big conference 
players see this positive correlation with points, assists, rebounds and field goal percentage. As 
you can see, both small and big conference players have a positive correlation with draft stock in 
respect to field goal percentage, hence, this paper’s emphasis on race and performance in terms 
of just that, field goal percentage.   
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3 Background 
The NBA and NFL are two of the few places in the country where African Americans 
have a large majority when it comes to race in the workplace. This offers a unique opportunity to 
look at wage equality and performance through the scope of one of the rare work environments 
where African Americans hold a significant majority. Is there still wage discrimination in the 
NBA for African Americans, where they are widely considered the better players in the league 
overall? Do they get drafted higher or lower in the NBA Draft compared to their white 
counterparts with similar college statistics? This paper will go in depth to look at the 1999 
through 2003 NBA Drafts to compare black and white players in regards to draft selection, 
career earnings and NBA win shares based on college statistics, to attempt to paint the picture of 
whether wage and/or performance discrimination is still prominent in a workplace where black 
players have a significant majority over white players. 
The NBA hasn’t always been a black dominated sport. When the league was founded in 
June 1946, there were no African American players at that time in the league, since at that time 
the racial divide was extremely high. However, just 4 years later in 1950, the first African 
American player, Chuck Cooper, was drafted into the NBA. Even though Cooper was the first 
black player to be drafted into the NBA, he was not the first to play in an NBA game. That honor 
belongs to Earl Lloyd of the Washington Capitols, due to scheduling; his team played a day 
before Cooper’s team. Lloyd had a great career, playing nine seasons in the NBA and having his 
best year in the 1955 season where he and his teammate Jim Tucker, were the first black players 
to play on an NBA championship team. Many black players back in the 1950’s believed the 
NBA had an unwritten rule that no more than 4 black players were to be allowed on one team at 
a time. There was even a saying to go along with this: “You can play one black player on the 
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road, two at home and three if they were way behind.” This was the way blacks were viewed in 
the early days of the NBA, but TIDES will help us understand the scope of the league, as we 
view it today. 
The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sports (TIDES), who put out an annual Racial 
and Gender Report Card that breaks down the percentage of players by race in the NBA, 
revealed that, in 2016, the NBA was 18.3% white, including Non-Americans. Of the 30 teams in 
the league, 8 teams did not have a white American on their roster, and 10 other teams had only 
one. Contrasting this with 20 years ago, in the 1996-1997 season, there were only three such 
teams who did not employ an American born white player in the NBA. This speaks volumes to 
the change in the racial landscape of the NBA as it has progressed to the product we see on the 
floor today. To paint a picture of what this would look like in Corporate America, if you thought 
of each NBA team, 30 in all, as being a different office of a single company. It’s unprecedented 
for that company to have 60% of their offices, that are located across the country, have only 1 
American born white individual at each location or none, at all. So, for a league to go from what 
started with not a single black player in the 1940’s to having about 75% in 2016, there is 
definitely a reverse racial majority study here worth pursuing more in depth.  
 
4 Data Acquisition 
 The dataset for this paper was compiled almost exclusively from www.basketball-
reference.com, an extensive database of basketball statistics. They have almost anything you 
could ever want to look at for a single player, from their bio, where they were born/went to 
school, to any advanced stat that you could dream up, such as their per 36 statistics, which is 
how that player would perform if their stats were extrapolated over 36 minutes played in a 48 
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minute game. The data includes all draft picks from the 1999 draft up until the 2003 draft to 
insure that players have both, completed a majority of their career, and were as recent as 
possible. Including players who are either retired or approaching retirement, makes it easier to 
determine how their race and performance in college affected their NBA careers. In these 5 draft 
classes there were 288 players selected overall. Out of those 288 players, 12 of them were 
drafted right out of high school, 49 were players drafted from international teams and 41 of them 
were players who never set foot on an NBA court. Seeing that our study requires players who 
have had both an NCAA career and an NBA career, these 102 players were removed from the 
dataset to ensure that our parameters were met. This resulted in 186 observations containing 195 
variables for each player. After filtering out these players, we are left with 106 players who were 
drafted in the first round of their respective draft class and 80 players who were drafted in the 
second round of their draft class. This makes sense, due to the fact that first round picks have a 
much better chance of sticking with a team after being drafted because they have a certain 
percentage of their contract guaranteed, compared to second round picks who very rarely have 
any of their contract guaranteed. Opportunity cost comes into play here, as well, since teams are 
much more willing to give up on a player they drafted in the latter parts of the second round, as 
opposed to players they drafted in the lottery (which are players drafted in the top 14 of the 30 
selections of the NBA draft) for the sheer fact that they have more development time and effort 
put into these players. The teams drafting in the lottery are teams that did not make the playoffs 
that year and therefore are afforded the luxury of drafting one of the better players in that years 
draft class to attempt to keep the balance of power more neutral.  
The variables in the dataset include what round and pick that player was drafted, what 
team drafted them, basic statistics that are looked at as most important in basketball circles such 
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as; points per game, assists per game, rebounds per game, steals per game, blocks per game, 
overall field goal percentage and 3-point percentage, among numerous other basic and advanced 
statistics that player accumulated during their college and NBA careers. I have also created a 
dummy variable called BigConf, which signifies a player who went to a school that is part of a 
top conference in division 1 basketball. Big Conference is defined as equal to 1 if the player 
attended a school in the ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac-12, SEC. The rank of the school that 
player went to has been included, as well from the U.S. News and World Report website. The 
given school a player attended was assigned the ranking that corresponded with what the U.S. 
News and World Report determined. If the school was not ranked, they received a ranking of 
999. Final Four and AP All American are variables that are put in place to measure the impact of 
a player on his team. They indicate how many times that player was in the final four or made an 
AP All American team. The age a player was drafted into the NBA is included in the regressions, 
as well. These variables make up the baseline regression for all 3 regressions with dependent 
variables Pick, Career Earnings and NBA Win Shares, respectively. Running the baseline 
regression, we are able to see the player’s performance in regard to these variables. Then, adding 
in the interaction term of black and field goal percentage, we are able to see how race comes into 
play in determining that player’s performance, more specifically, how race and performance 
effect their draft position, their career earnings and their NBA win shares.  
 
5 Results 
 When we look at the baseline regression using draft pick (Pk) as the dependent variable, 
we see that there are obvious independent variables that jump out as significant when analyzing 
draft position on college statistics. First of all, one has college field goal percentage (CoFGpct) 
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with a .006 p-value and a negative coefficient of -85.14. With field goal percentage being just 
that, a percentage, we can interpret this as follows; with a 10% increase in one’s field goal 
percentage, an extreme amount for the sake of interpretation, a player would raise their draft 
position by 8.5 spots. In the case with draft pick, a negative coefficient is a good thing because, 
as mentioned before, draft selection goes from 1-60 with 1 being the best and 60 being the worst. 
So, this causes the meaning of the signs to be flipped, making negative good for a players draft 
slot and positive moving them to a later pick. The fact that FG% is highly significant is 
understandable, seeing that teams would want players that are more efficient. However, when the 
interaction term is introduced later on, we’ll see just how this affects a black player, everything 
else held constant. Another obvious variable significance is 3-point percentage at a .006 p-value 
and a -37.03 coefficient; this follows the same logic as FG%, in that players that can shoot a high 
percentage from the 3-point line are looked at in a much better light than those who aren’t great 
shooters. For example, to be an elite 3-point shooter you should shoot above 40% from that 
range, being a decent to good 3-point shooter is in the range of 35-39% and shooting under 35% 
from the 3-point line is considered poor. Rebounds per game comes in significant at a .049 
confidence interval and a positive coefficient of 1.43. It’s interesting to see that raising one’s 
rebounds per game by 1 actually decreases your draft stock by a bit less than 1.5 positions. I 
would expect that to go the opposite way, as rebounding in the NBA has been a huge plus among 
winning teams in the NBA for years. Moving on, we have steals per game, significant just below 
the .05 level with a p-value of .036 and a coefficient of -4.58. This makes sense, in that defense 
has always been said to “win championships” so, seeing that adding 1 steal to your per game 
total, you raise your draft stock by a bit less than 5 slots, isn’t too surprising. Continuing with the 
defense theme, we have blocks per game being highly significant with a p-value less than .001 
	
13	
and a coefficient of -6.43. It seems that defense, in the form of steals and blocks is a big part of 
what is looked at in the draft. This jump in draft stock from these defensive statistics, rebounds, 
steals and blocks could stem from coaches and front offices in the NBA seeing players that are 
proficient in these categories as both fundamentally sound and athletically superior to their 
counterparts. Meaning they were taught well in the levels before college and have a great 
understanding of positioning, boxing out and moving your feet without reaching/fouling. 
However, a high number of blocks could also be an indication of off-the-charts elite athleticism, 
which scouts rave about and a great sense of timing that other players just do not possess. School 
Rank comes in significant at .039 and a minimal coefficient of less than 1. Even though the 
coefficient is very small, school rank would have a negative effect on your draft position, but not 
enough to make a difference, at all. Next up, we have the variable APAll-American, which 
indicates whether the player was picked as an Associated Press All-American after that given 
season. The honor is one of the best in the country and rewards players for their exceptional play 
throughout the season, in addition to being one of the biggest accolades a player can receive as a 
collegiate athlete. The p-value is very significant at less than .001 and the coefficient comes in at 
-6.59. Therefore, being selected an AP All-American raises your draft stock by just over 6 slots. 
This would seem to be obvious, however many times; some of the best college basketball players 
go in the 2nd round of the NBA draft or even undrafted. Lastly, we have age drafted which has a 
p-value of less than .001 and a coefficient 4.13, telling us that being a year older your draft pick 
drops by over 4 slots. This makes sense because most teams, obviously, want the most skilled 
players but the youngest players shoot up draft boards so they can be molded the way the team 
best sees fit. The younger the player, the more untapped potential they are said to possess for the 
future. Just outside of the .05 percent interval is where Final 4 variable lands. This tells us how 
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many times over a player’s career, that they made the Final Four. You are considered “The Final 
Four” in college basketball if you are one of the last 4 teams standing in the NCAA Tournament 
that is held at the end of every season. The coefficient is -2.64, so we can conclude, if it were 
significant, that making the Final Four raises your draft pick by over 2 and a half slots. 
 In the next regression, what we ultimately want to see is the effect of race on draft pick in 
respect to field goal percentage. So, we add in the interaction term, which is our black dummy 
variable multiplied by field goal percentage. After doing this, we see that if a black player raised 
his field goal percentage by 10%, he would increase his draft position by 13.1 picks. This could 
be the difference between being a late first round pick to being a lottery pick, or from being a 
second round pick to being a first round pick.  
 Now we will look at lnCareerEarnings regressed on the same college statistics from the 
draft pick regression. First, we will analyze the baseline regression without the interaction term. 
When looking at this regression, we want to be able to interpret the coefficients in respect to 
lnCareerEarnings. To do this, we will look at the mean player for that certain variable and 
multiply this to the coefficient of the same variable in order to get the percent change in income 
one would see from either an increase or decrease of that variable. Steals per game comes in very 
significant at .015 with a coefficient of .80. Referring to the Summary Statistics table we can 
gather that an average player accrues 1.2 steals per game. Therefore if we multiply this to the 
coefficient of .80 to the average 1.2 steals, we come up with .96. This means that if an average 
player attained 1 more steal a game, an extreme example; they would look to increase their 
career earnings by 9.6%. Field goal percentage is significant, as well, with a p-value of .016 and 
a coefficient of 10.43. Seeing that the average player in the sample shoots 48% from the floor, as 
seen in the summary statistics table, we multiply .48 times 10.43 giving us 5.01. Raising your 
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field goal percentage by 10% would be no small feat, and in doing so you would increase your 
career income by 5%. Looking at Age Drafted, we have a confidence interval less than .001 and 
a coefficient that sits at -.55. The average player drafted in this sample is 21.54 years old. 
Therefore, if we multiplied this, 21.54 by -.55, you come up with -11.85.  
 Now, looking at the regression with the same interaction variable implemented from the 
previous regression (black multiplied by college field goal percentage) we can see that a black 
player that raises his field goal percentage by 10% would increase his career income by 8.3%, 
seeing that the coefficient comes in at 17.34, we multiply that by the same .48 average field goal 
percentage in our sample. This is significantly higher than a white player from the previous 
baseline regression. You can see that an efficient black player’s pay scale is much more sensitive 
to a FG% spike and is drafted much higher than his white counterpart. 
 To tie this all together we will look at the final regression, where we have the same 
baseline regression and the black/college field goal percentage interaction regression but now 
with NBA win shares as the dependent variable. First, we saw how a player’s race and 
performance in college determined their draft pick. Then, we looked at how race and 
performance dictated their career earnings. Both of these variables don’t exactly translate to 
winning basketball games. You could be drafted number 1 overall in the draft and still not be a 
great player or you could make hundreds of millions of dollars and still not exactly contribute to 
a winning culture. However, when looking at win shares, it’s pretty straightforward. Your final 
number is nothing but the amount of wins you attributed to your team and it will be interesting to 
see how race and performance compare to the amount of money a player made in their career or 
where they were selected in the draft.  
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 Following the “defense wins championships” theme, the first significant variable is 
rebounds per game with a p-value at .017 and a coefficient of 3.11. Keeping with this theme 
comes steals per game with significance at .011 and coefficient at 15.39. After that, we see 
Final4 with a p-value, just above the .05 confidence interval, at .054 and a coefficient sitting at 
7.55. Finally, we see age drafted at less than a .001 p-value and a -7.14 coefficient.  
 After adding in the interaction term we’ve been working with, black multiplied by field 
goal percentage, we can see that rebounds per game comes in significant again with a .020 p-
value and a coefficient sitting at 2.98. This implies that grabbing one more rebound per game in 
college would increase your NBA win shares by 2.98. Next up we have steals per game sporting 
a p-value of .014 and a coefficient at 14.46, showing that if you increased your steals per game 
by 1 in college, which again is a sizable increase, you would raise your NBA win shares by 
14.46, making you a far more valuable player. Now we look at the interaction term, which is 
highly significant at a .001 p-value and a coefficient of 289.06. This tells us that if a black player 
were to raise his field goal percentage by 10%, he would skyrocket his win shares by 28.9 points, 
compared to a white player. Making the final four affects your win shares in a positive way, as 
well, as we can see from the .044 p-value and the 7.75 coefficient. Last, we see age drafted with 
a p-value of less than .001 and a coefficient of -7.58 showing us what would seem to be an 
obvious case, that if a player is one year older they lower their NBA win shares by 7.58 over 
their careers. Seeing that a player’s win share is a cumulative number over the course of one’s 
career, this would seem to make sense.  
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6 Conclusion 
 Racial tension in society doesn’t begin and end with a study on professional sports like 
the NBA and NFL. The way race is perceived has huge consequences on the economy, politics 
and social growth, not only here in the United States, but around the world. If we can identify 
and understand the motivation behind racial inequality within a smaller organization, for 
example the NBA, we may begin to go about healthier solutions that start to put the country in a 
more advantageous position to tackle discrimination and improve as a society. In studying the 
NBA, it gives us the opportunity to first, analyze something we love as people, the entertainment 
industry, but also try to bring awareness to social issues by analyzing race and performance in a 
basketball league. If further research were to be done on this topic, it could be expanded upon by 
adding in a larger number of variables that I just simply didn’t have the resources to compile. An 
example of this would be to add in variables that measured athletic ability such as vertical jump, 
wingspan, lane agility and three quarter sprint. Using a variety of these statistics that are 
recorded during the NBA Combine, which takes place a few weeks before the NBA Draft, would 
have been interesting to include in these regressions to see how such athletic ability affected the 
results. However, due to the recording inconsistency in these statistics during this time period, 
many of the player’s combine results were not available. Another avenue to explore would be to 
somehow evaluate international players and players who come straight out of high school, as this 
may be allowed to happen again in 2021, with the same criteria used to analyze college players. 
This would be difficult in the fact that a select few international leagues are considered much 
better than college basketball, while high school is considered much worse. If there were some 
way to incorporate all of these players into one dataset and analyze them side-by-side, this would 
be very advantageous for NBA teams. However, the results of this paper, especially in terms of 
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the interaction variable that connects race with the top form of performance efficiency for an 
NBA player, field goal percentage, go hand in hand when you think of economics as a whole. 
The overarching economic assumption is that decision makers are rational and it seems that 
hypothesis holds true throughout this paper. If a black player improves his efficiency in terms of 
field goal percentage, that player is much more sensitive to draft pick, career earning and win 
share spikes than his white counterpart. This paper will not solve the world issues on race and 
performance when it comes to wage inequality for minorities. However, looking at a smaller 
scale organization that is predominately black, can go a long way in understanding some of the 
root causes of what is plaguing the United States, and the world as a whole, in society today.  	 	
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
 
Obs 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
S.D. 
 
 
 
Min 
 
 
 
Max 
Draft Pick 186 26.199 15.567 1 57 
lnCareerEarnings 184 2.326 1.889 -2.956 5.294 
NBA Win Shares 186 20.849 27.94 -1.1 124.9 
Black 186 0.769 0.423 0 1 
College Games 178 93.315 34.707 17 146 
College Points 178 13.808 3.715 5.4 23.9 
College Assists 178 2.328 1.632 0.3 8.7 
College Total Rebounds 178 5.884 2.041 2.1 10.8 
College Steals 178 1.198 0.592 0.2 2.8 
College Blocks 178 0.963 0.85 0 4.4 
College Field Goal Pct 178 0.484 0.058 0.363 0.695 
College 3-point Pct 145 0.329 0.084 0 0.5 
Big Conference 186 0.747 0.436 0 1 
School Rank 186 194.613 307.475 5 999 
Final Four 186 0.339 0.622 0 3 
AP All American 186 0.344 0.597 0 3 
Age Drafted 186 21.543 1.352 18 25 
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Table 2  
Relationship Between College Statistics and Draft Pick 
 Baseline Regression Regression w/ Interaction 
  (1) (2) 
 
Draft Pick Draft Pick 
     
Black 1.960 64.641*** 
 
(2.741) (19.113) 
 
College Games 0.050 0.052 
 
(0.041) (0.040) 
 
College Points -0.585 -0.816* 
 
(0.437) (0.453) 
 
College Assists -0.363 -0.643 
 
(0.931) (0.879) 
 
College Total Rebounds 1.426** 1.486** 
 
(0.718) (0.735) 
 
College Steals -4.585** -4.164* 
 
(2.165) (2.140) 
 
College Blocks -6.426*** -6.508*** 
 
(1.691) (1.719) 
 
College field Goal Pct -85.137*** 7.991 
 
(30.603) (28.979) 
 
Black#c.College FG Pct 
 
-131.016*** 
  
(39.584) 
 
College 3-point Pct -37.032*** -37.861*** 
 
(13.254) (13.775) 
 
Big Conference 3.995 3.550 
 
(3.317) (3.277) 
 
School Rank 0.010** 0.010** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
Final Four -2.642* -2.733* 
 
(1.428) (1.492) 
AP All American -6.591*** -6.454*** 
 
(1.706) (1.710) 
 
Age Drafted 
 
4.127*** 
 
4.328*** 
 
(0.981) (1.018) 
 
Constant -6.291 -52.101* 
 
(28.674) (25.978) 
   
Observations 145 145 
R-squared 0.501 0.527 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Baseline Regression Regression w/ Interaction 
  (1) (2) 
 
lnCareerEarnings lnCareerEarnings 
     
Black -0.468 -8.764*** 
 
(0.342) (2.568) 
 
College Games 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
College Points -0.011 0.020 
 
(0.054) (0.054) 
 
College Assists 0.020 0.052 
 
(0.143) (0.131) 
 
College Total Rebounds 0.060 0.053 
 
(0.096) (0.096) 
 
College Steals 0.793*** 0.737** 
 
(0.322) (0.314) 
 
College Block 0.216 0.226 
 
(0.250) (0.252) 
 
College Field Goal Pct 10.428*** -1.921 
 
(4.262) (4.077) 
 
Black#c.College FG Pct 
 
17.340*** 
  
(5.203) 
 
College 3-Point Pct 1.858 1.966 
 
(1.846) (1.826) 
 
Big Conference 0.376 0.435 
 
(0.404) (0.396) 
 
School Rank 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
Final Four 0.334 0.348 
 
(0.224) (0.216) 
 
AP All American 0.277 0.259 
 
(0.250) (0.249) 
 
Age Drafted -0.550*** -0.576*** 
 
(0.127) (0.131) 
 
Constant 6.342* 12.401*** 
 
(3.249) (3.424) 
   Observations 144 144 
R-squared 0.293 0.325 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 	 	
Table 3  
Relationship Between College statistics and Career Earnings 
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 Baseline Regression Regression w/ Interaction 
  (1) (2) 
 
NBA Win Shares NBA Win Shares 
     
Black -2.880 -141.175*** 
 
(5.256) (41.184) 
 
College Games 0.000 -0.004 
 
(0.073) (0.070) 
 
College Points -1.349* -0.838 
 
(0.815) (0.798) 
 
College Assists -0.279 0.339 
 
(2.159) (1.997) 
 
College Total Rebounds 3.112** 2.979** 
 
(1.281) (1.264) 
 
College Steals 15.389** 14.461** 
 
(5.980) (5.798) 
 
College Blocks 0.273 0.453 
 
(3.640) (3.607) 
 
College Field Goal Pct 135.727* -69.743 
 
(72.742) (69.990) 
 
Black#c.College FG Pct 
 
289.063*** 
  
(87.959) 
 
College 3-point Pct 49.990* 51.820* 
 
(28.585) (28.205) 
Big Conference 0.194 1.176 
 
(5.377) (5.247) 
 
School Rank 0.014 0.012 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
Final Four 7.549* 7.750** 
 
(3.890) (3.817) 
 
AP All American 6.543 6.241 
 
(4.197) (4.184) 
 
Age Drafted -7.142*** -7.585*** 
 
(1.805) (1.808) 
 
Constant 72.243 173.316*** 
 
(56.355) (52.693) 
   Observations 145 145 
R-squared 0.325 0.362 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 4 
Relationship Between College Statistics and NBA Win Shares 
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